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FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR PRIVATE SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS: THE CRUMBLING FOUNDATION
JoHN M. SiRATr, JR.*
Graduates of Wade Hampton Academy in Orangeburg, South Caro-
lina, receive a bronze lapel pin as an emblem of their alma mater
which is a replica of one worn during Reconstruction. Beneath a
Confederate flag, the pin bears the legend, "Survivor." ' The symbol is
appropriate to Wade Hampton as well as to scores of other private
segregated schools, which have recently risen in the South as a last
attempt to turn the flank of Brown v. Board of Education.2
Unlike similar academies in other southern states, Wade Hampton
owes nothing for its "survival" to tuition subsidy from state govern-
ment sources. A single payment was made under a South Carolina
statute before it was ruled unconstitutional, and further payments were
enjoined. Yet, ironically, this school and many of its type must credit
their survival, in part at least, to the federal government. Consciously,
deliberately, and against continual objection, the Internal Revenue
Service has approved exemptions for private, racially segregated schools
under the charitable sections of the Internal Revenue Code, thus sharing
the costs of developing them. According to the current Commissioner,
the policy provoked "a series of studies that have gone on almost con-
stantly since late 1959." 4 Letter rulings were issued routinely, then
suspended, then continued under a cryptic restatement of policy.
*A.B., Davidson College, 1964; MA., Oxford University, 1966; LL.B., Yale Law
School, 1969.
1. See Leeson, Private Schools for Whites Face Some Hurdles, 3 Sou-maai ED. REP,
Nov. 1967, at 13.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Leeson, supra note 1.
4. Official Transcript of Commissioner Randolph W. Thrower's News Conference on
the Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools (July 10, 1970).
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In July 1970, the Service, threatened with an injunction, reversed
its policy and announced that it would revoke and deny exemptions
to private schools unwilling to follow a publicly announced nondis-
criminatory admissions policy.5 The Commissioner explained: "This
is a statement of a position which the administration thinks is correct,
which it will seek to maintain and uphold in court, but which has not
been acted upon by the United States Supreme Court and is a question
that has to be resolved." I He did not choose to clarify the legal basis
for interpreting the charitable sections of the Code to preclude ex-
emptions for private, segregated schools, and he avoided comment
on the rules which the Service would adopt to implement its policy,
insisting that the specific procedure would evolve from experience.
This article examines the basic issue which the Commissioner and the
Service have failed to clarify, the policy and doctrine underlying the
conflicting postures of the federal government on tax exemption of
private, segregated schools.
THE CHARITABLE SEcTIONs OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
It is helpful to begin the discussion with a review of the charitable
sections of the Code which will provide a frame of reference for this
article. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 170(c) (2) al-
lows an individual to deduct from his adjusted gross income contribu-
tions to a "corporation, trust, . . . or foundation ...organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals." Section 170(c) (2) (C) provides, however, that no part of
the net earnings of any such organization may inure to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual. Section 170(c) (2) (D) provides
further that eligible organizations must refrain from lobbying and
other efforts to influence legislation. "Educational organizations" are
given an added status by section 170(b)(A)(ii). It raises from 20
percent to 30 percent the maximum percentage of adjusted gross in-
come subject to offset by charitable deductions. For purposes of sec-
tion 170(b) an "educational organization" is defined by section 503 (b)
(2) as one "which normally maintains a regular faculty and curricu-
lum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students
in attendance at the place where its educational activities are carried
on."
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Section 501(c) (3) exempts from federal tax the income of "[c]or-
porations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charit-
able, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational pur-
poses .... ." The remaining provisions of section 501 (c) (3) are much
the same as those of section 170(c).
Besides the income tax deduction for charitable contributions granted
by section 170, section 2522 exempts the donor from gift tax on such
contributions and section 2055 provides that charitable bequests may be
deducted from the taxable estate in computing federal estate tax. Both
sections are practically the same as sections 170(c) and 501(c) (3) in
their terms and provisions.
Contributions made to a school classified as tax exempt entitle the
donor to take a deduction from his taxable income. A donor who
provides a building or land for a school site, if the basis of his property
is below market value, may deduct the current market value without
realizing capital gain. A wealthy donor who has used up his $60,000
lifetime tax exemption can avoid the payment of a gift tax (if the gift
exceeds $3000), and take a charitable deduction instead. He, like the
donor of low basis property, escapes one federal tax and reduces an-
other.7
BENEFITS OF TAX EXEMPTION TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS
The extent to which deductibility actually induces donations is
disputed by specialists in the tax field. Private school promoters ap-
pear to believe, however, that the tax deductible feature is an attrac-
tive incentive. An advertisement once used by John T. Morgan Acad-
emy of Selma, Alabama, reflects this belief:
Giving Can Be Generous, Yet Frugal Contributions by indi-
viduals or corporations to a qualified not-for-profit institution
(such as the Dallas County Private School Foundation) are de-
ductible up to 30% of the individual's Adjusted Gross Income and
up to 5% of the corporation's net income. Unusual savings may
be realized by contributing stocks, bonds, or other capital assets
which have increased in value since acquired, instead of selling the
securities and contributing the proceeds.3
7. See generally B. BnrKER, FEDERAL INcoME, ESTATE, AND Gr TAXAnON (3d ed.
1964).
8. UNurm SrATES COMMISION oN. Cvi Ricnis, SouTrRERm ScHoor. DSEEG T on-
1966-67 at 157 n.52 (1967).
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Shortly before the Commissioner's July 1970 announcement,9 a Mis-
sissippi school official conceded that without tax exemption private
schools would be "badly hurt," and acknowledged that a denial of
exemption "could imperil many schools on marginal budgets." 10 In
other words, if donations are insufficient to finance a school plant, they
may, nevertheless, make the marginal difference in operating funds
enabling the school to carry on in improvised quarters, or provide
enough equity to make mortgage financing feasible. If its property is
encumbered, the school will probably find it necessary to apply any
net income to amortize its mortgage debt. An exemption alone may not
lead to financial salvation, but if there is taxable income, the exemption
may save the school a significant percentage of its net income. This
income which would otherwise be paid in taxes may instead be used
to retire mortgage debts and acquire equity in a permanent school
plant.
In Alabama, the Civil Rights Commission investigated the financing
of three private, segregated schools, and found in each case a significant
disparity between tuition revenues and operating and construction
costs. Without donations, the schools would have sustained heavy
deficits." In Coffey v. Mississippi, 2 in which a federal court held un-
constitutional the Mississippi tuition-grant statute, the government pre-
pared a summary chart on the operation of private, segregated schools
in Mississippi. The data compiled showed that a number of schools
relied significantly on contributions, even with a program of tuition
subsidy in effect. Without tuition grants, these schools presumably would
have been even more dependent on private contributions.
The government data in Coffey also demonstrated the relationship
between the newly formed segregated schools and the public school
system, showing a direct correlation between public school integration
and the rise of private schools. With the loss of white students, most
public schools lose state financial support, which is normally allotted
on a per.student basis. The exodus of white students threatens the
loss of economies of scale that the school system might have enjoyed
before. In short, while allotment funds decline, the cost of education
9. Official Transcript, supra note 4.
10. Tax Report: Segregated Schools in the South Look to the Churches for Sanc-
tuary, The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
11. Parker, Federal Boost for Segregation, 1 CIVIL RIGHTS DIGEST, Fall, 1968, at 24.
See also UNIT- STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 74-75.
12. Coffey v. Mississippi State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss.
1969).
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per student rises. Raising tax levies or issuing bonds for the public
school system becomes politically onerous, as the experience of Not-
toway County, Virginia illustrates.
School officials in Nottoway County, Virginia, reportedly had dif-
ficulty encouraging voter approval of a $1.6 million bond issue in
1967 to finance public school development. White citizens had
virtually no interest in the public system; more than 300 white
children had escaped impending desegregation of public schools
by enrolling in private schools. In a statewide private school fund
drive, however, the same county topped all other Virginia coun-
ties in raising money.'3
In Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission14 a panel
from the fifth circuit surveyed the burgeoning system of private schools
in Louisiana and spelled out the threat categorically:
The facts this case presents point in only one direction: Unless
this system is destroyed, it will shatter to bits the public school
system of Louisiana and kill the hope that now exists for equal edu-
cational opportunities for all our citizens, black and white.15
THE IRS RULINGS ON PRIVATE SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
In the summer of 1967, the Civil Rights Commission published a
progress report on the past school year.'6 The report deprecated the
grant of tax exemption to private, segregated schools:
Many private segregated schools attended exclusively by white
students have been established in the South in response to public
school desegregation. In some districts such schools have drained
from the public schools most or all of the white students and
many white faculty members. Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, institutions organized and operated exclusively for chari-
table purposes and not for private benefit are exempt from paying
income taxes and contributors to these institutions are entitled to
deduct contributions, within certain limits, from their taxable in-
comes. Some racially segregated private schools have been ap-
proved by the Internal Revenue Service for the receipt of these tax
13. Parker, supra note 11, at 25.
14. 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967).
15. Id. at 857.
16. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGm-s, supra note 8.
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benefits, while others have applications pending before the Internal
Revenue Service . . . . The benefits given racially segregated
private schools by the grant of Federal tax benefits are extensive,
and contribute to the growth and development of such schools.
Contributions to these schools lessen the tax burdens of individual
taxpayers, allow the schools to continue in operation, and diminish
Federal revenues.17
On the basis of this finding, the Commission recommended that:
The Secretary of the Treasury should request an opinion of the
Attorney General as to whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 or the Internal Revenue Code authorizes or requires the
Internal Revenue Code to withhold tax benefits presently being
afforded by the Service to racially segregated private schools, or
whether Congressional action is necessary to assure that such
benefits are withheld .... 18
The Commission added a memorandum prepared by its legal staff,
elaborating the case against tax exemption for private, segregated
schools.19 Before publication of the report, the Office of General
Counsel of the Civil Rights Commission sent a copy of this memoran-
dum to its counterpart, the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue
Service. Staff members of the IRS responded that they had a similar
concern over such exemptions, and that they were then withholding
action on forty-two applications for exemption, pending a review of
.applicable law.20
,On August 2, 1967, the Internal Revenue Service reported its de-
cisiion in a press release:
The Internal Revenue Service announced today that it has re-
sumed ruling on the tax exempt status of private, non-profit
schools. This action marks the culmination of an extensive review
of judicial and legislative developments in the civil rights area to
determine the effect of these developments on qualification of
schools for exemption for income tax purposes and their eligibility
to receive deductible charitable contributions.
In resuming ruling, the Service stated that its general con-
17. Id. at 89.
18. Id. at 99.
19. Id. Appendix VIII, at 142-62.
20. Id.
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clusion is that exemption will be denied and contributions will not
be deductible if the operation of the school is on a segregated
basis and its involvement with the state or political subdivision is
such as to make the operation unconstitutional or a violation of
the laws of the United States.
Where, however, the school is private and does not have such
degree of involvement with the political subdivision as has been
determined by the courts to constitute State action for constitu-
tional purposes, rulings will be issued holding the school exempt
and the contributions to it deductible assuming that all other re-
quirements of the statute are met.
The Service emphasized that it will continue to watch carefully
the legislative and judicial developments in the area of state action
to determine whether the activities of any particular school
render its operation illegal or unconstitutional and therefore dis-
qualify it under 501(c)(3).21
In a more complete report in the New York Times, the Service
explained that it intended to deny exemption to any school that was
the direct recipient of state financial assistance.22 This policy was re-
quired, the Service said, by Aaron v. Cooper.23 "Revenue officials said
that as they read that case, it renders illegal only direct payments by
governmental units to private schools organized to evade segregation. ' '24
The Service explained that the cryptic reference to state-involvement
was specifically a reference to Griffin v. State Board of EduCation,25 in
which Virginia tuition grants were held unconstitutional because they
"predominantly maintained" private segregated schools.
Arguments against tax exemption for private segregated schools were
not discussed in either the official release or the news report. The Civil
Rights Commission had contended in its brief that.private segregated
schools do not meet the statutory standards of the charitable sections,
and had further argued that tax exemption was tantamount to federal
financial assistance and should be granted only under the conditions
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 The Commission had
21. Internal Revenue Service News Release (Aug. 2, 1967), 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED.
TAx R P., 6734.
22. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967, at 24, col. 3.
23. 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
24. N.Y. Times, supra note 22.
25. 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965).
26. UNmra STATES COmmssIoSN ON Civm RI GHs, supra note 8, Appendix VIII, at
142-62.
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also suggested that under Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,27
exemption should be denied on the grounds that a grant of exemption
would tend to frustrate "sharply defined national policy." The IRS
failed to answer any of these arguments. As the Commissioner noted
at the time of his July 10, 1970 announcement, "The 1967 policy
statement was rather inconclusive and in practical operation no adverse
rulings were ever issued under it." 28
In late 1969, Negro plaintiffs from Mississippi initiated a class action
against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to enjoin prospective exemptions and to rescind all existing
exemptions of private, racially exclusive schools in Mississippi. A three-
judge federal court was convened in the District of Columbia, and on
January 12, 1970, the court issued a preliminary injunction restraining
the Commission from "approving any pending or future application
for tax exempt status . . . by any private school located in the State
of Mississippi which enrolls students in any of the grades first through
twelve .... ",29 The court granted the preliminary injunction as inter-
locutory relief, and in the course of its opinion indicated the probable
nature of its final order. The complaint charged that sections 170 and
501 of the Code were unconstitutional to the extent that they supported
the establishment and maintenance of private segregated schools. In the
alternative, the complaint argued on non-constitutional grounds that seg-
regated schools were not entitled to exemption under the tax code be-
cause they did not serve a public purpose. The court first found that the
complaint raised a substantial constitutional question, warranting juris-
diction of a three-judge court. Citing from a sample of civil rights cases,
the court then declared that the Fifth Amendment forbids the federal
government from aiding private discrimination. It stopped short of
the conclusion, however, that tax exemption of private, segregated
schools was unconstitutional, resting its decision on the proposition that
the federal government should not frustrate the efforts of state govern-
ments to adhere to the Constitution. "The Federal Government is not
constitutionally free to frustrate the only constitutionally permissible
state policy, of a unitary school system, by providing government sup-
port for endeavors to continue under private auspices the kind of racially
segregated dual school system that the state formerly supported." 10
27. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
28. Official Transcript, supra note 4.
29. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1140 (D. D.C. 1970).
30. Id. at 1137.
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The court reserved judgment on the broader issue of a permanent
mandatory injunction to revoke exemptions previously approved. A
subsequent hearing on the merits was continued when government
lawyers revealed that a change of policy was imminent and would be
announced by the Service in a matter of days. Although some have
argued that the Service's reversal in mid-July 1970 has made Green v.
Kennedy moot, all sides have expressed interest in obtaining final ju-
dicial review.31 It is probable, therefore, that the arguments first raised
by the Civil Rights Commission 32 and later asserted in litigation will
eventually be heard in court. With this probability in mind, it is ap-
propriate that those arguments be examined.
THE LAW OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND THE CHARITABLE SEcTIONs
In evaluating the arguments for and against exemption of private
segregated schools, it is logical to begin with the policy of granting
exemption that the Service first espoused and has now seemingly aban-
doned. On its face the tax code appears to support that policy. Read
literally, the charitable sections of the Code exempt virtually any school
-segregated or integrated, state-supported or privately maintained.
This interpretation is the one which advocates of exemption for private
schools have consistently espoused. It takes a curious subtlety to reach
the conclusion the Service first upheld in 1967, to construe the Code as
distinguishing "wholly private" from "state-involved" segregated schools,
and to grant exemption to one while denying it to the other. Actually
the IRS did not rely on a literal reading of the charitable sections to
defend its exemption of segregated schools, but rather supported its
policy as one developed in charitable trust law, which it viewed as a
complement to the charitable sections of the Code.33 In Revenue Ruling
67-325,14 the IRS took the position that contributions to community
recreational facilities would be deductible only if the facilities were
open on a racially non-discriminatory basis. No distinction was drawn
31. See Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 1970, at 2, col. 2; N.Y. Times, July 11,
1970, at 1, col. 8.
32. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8.
33. See Reiling, Federal Taxation: What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 AB.A. J.
525, 527 (1958). "If only the word charitable had been used, the exemption might have
been misconstrued by taxpayers not familiar with the legal meaning given to that
term, for charity in its popular sense is usually confined to good will to the poor and
suffering." Reiling argues that all of the enumerations of INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954,
§ 501(c) (3) are in accord with the legal notion of charity.
34. 1967-2 CUM. BuLL. 113.
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between state-involved and privately endowed facilities; it was simply
made a condition of tax exemption that a recreational facility admit
everyone, regardless of race. On its face, the ruling was irreconcilable
with the earlier decision on private school exemption.35 As a way of
explaining the ruling and, in effect, the apparent inconsistency, the
Service referred to charitable trust law. It first broadly stated that there
is no "specialized tax concept of charitable purposes, . . . [and the
charitable sections] of the Code . . . should be interpreted as favoring
only those purposes which are recognized as charitable in the generally
accepted legal sense." 16 Applying this principle, the Service found
that in the general law of charitable uses, "certain purposes have been
deemed to be beneficial to the community as a whole even though the
class or classes of possible beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct bene-
fit . . . do not include all the members of the community." 3 7 Among
these is a charitable trust to provide for education. A charity to pro-
vide recreation is to be distinguished and merits the favored legal treat-
ment of a charity only when all members of the community are
eligible to benefit from its use.
In this body of general law pertaining to purposes considered
charitable only where all members of the community are eligible
to receive a direct benefit, no sound basis has been found for
concluding that there would be an adequate charitable purpose if
some part of the whole community is excluded from benefiting
except where the exclusion is required by the nature or size of
the facility. Exclusion of a part of the entire community on the
basis of race, religion, nationality, belief, or other occupation hav-
ing no relation to the nature or size of the facility, would prevent
the purpose from being recognized as a sufficient public purpose
to justify its being held charitable under this general body of law.38
Reading the charitable sections of the Code as an extension of the
law of charitable trusts is not an innovation of the Internal Revenue
Service. On close interpretative questions, federal courts have assumed
that charitable trust law complements the charitable sections of the
Code, at least by way of analogy.39 In Girard Trust Company v. Corn-
85. Internal Revenue S-rvice News Release, supra note 21.
36. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 Cum. BuL. 116.
37. Id. at 115.
38. Id. at 116.
39. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance v. Helvering, 66 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir.
1933); Treas. Reg. SS 1.501 (c) (3), (d) (2).
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missioner,4 deciding whether a bequest to a Methodist temperance board
was entitled to a charitable deduction, Judge Goodrich on his motion
noted:
Reference to the law of charitable trusts we believe in point, as
does the dissent, although counsel for neither side has pressed the
analogy ... The majority of charitable trust cases . . . are not
directly controlling. But they furnish a strong analogy.4'
The syntax of the charitable sections does not compel this analogy.
The word "charities" is only one adjective that follows "religious" and
precedes "scientific" in describing the kinds of organizations that are
exempt from federal taxation and eligible for deductible gifts. It is
not uncommon, however, with a statute of broad terms, that a related
body of common law becomes a source of reference. In terms and
provisions, the relation of the charitable sections to charitable trust
law is remarkably close. The organizations exempted by section 501 (c)
(3) virtually all conform to approved purposes for charitable trusts.
Those that might be disputable in charitable trust law are arguably
included in the Code for that very reason, to settle their status for
federal tax purposes.42 The tax code rule that none of the earnings of
an exempt organization shall inure to the benefit of private shareholders
is paralleled by an equivalent rule of charitable trusts.43 Similarly, the
provision in the Code restricting the political activity of exempt organ-
izations is consistent with a tradition in the common law disfavoring
charitable trusts with political purposes.44
If one reads sections 170(c) and 501(c) (3) as extensions of chari-
table trust law, "charitable" becomes the rubric of these sections and
not just one of the kinds of organizations exempted. "Educational or-
ganizations," as it appears in these sections, is not read literally but as
legal idiom.- To elaborate on what the term implies, reference is made
to the general law of charities-which essentially is the common law of
charitable trusts that has grown out of the Elizabethan Statute of
Charitable Uses. 5
40. 122 F.2d 108 (3rd Cir. 1941).
41. Id. at 109-10.
42. See 4 A. Scor-, Tin LAw oF TRUSTS § 374.2 (3rd ed 1967). E.g., societies for
the prevention of cruelty to animals once were a topic of dispute in charitable trust law.
43. Id. § 368.
44. ld. § 374.6. , •
45. 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (1601). Discussed in 4 A. Scor, supra note 42, § 368.1. See
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In charitable trust law, any educational organization is considered
charitable if the schooling or instruction is not for private profit and
the class of students educated is sufficiently inclusive to be of benefit
to the community. As to racial restrictions, Scott argues that so long
as the class of students educated is broad enough to imply public bene-
fit, restriction of the class along racial lines will not vitiate the trust.46
Bogert once assumed the same position, but he no longer appears willing
to assert that racial restrictions are valid.4" It is enough here to point out
that the traditional law of charities has permitted educational trusts for
the benefit of a racially defined class.
It was apparently this analogy to charitable trusts that the IRS ap-
plied in deciding that the Code permitted exemptions for private seg-
regated schools. To summarize its reasoning: equity would sanction
a charitable trust for the benefit of a school, even though the school
discriminated racially among the students it accepted. Therefore, be-
cause the charitable sections of the Code are cut from the same cloth
as charitable trust law, contributions to a private school should be tax
deductible, and the school should be tax exempt, even though the school
is racially segregated.
The 1967 news release on private segregated schools failed to make
explicit this reasoning by analogy, but it is clearly the substance of
Revenue Ruling 67-325.49 More significantly, reports of the inter-
agency debate before publication of the news release confirm that
"[o]fficials of the Internal Revenue Service in discussions with the
Commission on Civil Rights staff prior to the public announcement,
maintained that the traditional law of charities tolerated racial restric-
tions upon educational charities." 5o
Charitable trust law reduces to a doctrine of public benefit, and is
one vehicle for putting a kind of public policy into the charitable sec-
generally Atiyah, Public Benefit in Charities, 21 MODERN L. Rnv. 138 (1958); Brunyate,
The Legal Definition of Charity, 61 L. Q. REv. 268 (1945).
46. 4 A. Sco-r, supra note 42, § 370.6.
47. In G. BOGERT, Tm LAw OF TRUSTs AND TRUSTEES (2d ed. 1960), the author
asserted unequivocally that racially restricted charitable trusts were permissible.
48. G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TRUSTs § 60 (4th ed. 1963). Bogert still
allows that "[a] settlor may limit the class to be educated as he desires so long as some
substantial social benefit will result, and if in the case of gifts to a state or an agency
of it, he does not deprive persons of their constitutional rights to equal protection
of the laws."
49. 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 116.
50. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8, Appendix VIII (em-
phasis added).
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tions of the Code as a source of reference. If applied, an analogy to the
law of charities nicely explains the paradox of ruling one month that
private schools may be racially restrictive and still tax exempt,51 while
ruling the next month that recreational facilities must be open to the
public without discrimination to merit tax exempt status.12 It does not
explain so readily why a "wholly" private school can discriminate
without risking its charitable status, while a "state-involved" private
school which discriminates is denied the grace of the Internal Revenue
Code. To validate this distinction, one must carry the charitable trust
analogy a step further. Applying the major premise that equity would
deny its sanction to a charitable trust for an illegal purpose, and the
minor premise that a "state-involved" private school operates illegally
if segregated, the Service could draw the conclusion that "state-in-
volved" private schools should be denied tax exempt status.
If this is the syllogism that was accepted, however, the distinction
between the "wholly private" and the "state-involved" school is as
illogical as ever. If the purpose of a segregated private school is con-
sidered educational, the added fact that the school is involved with the
state appears merely incidental. The state-school relationship, coupled
with the school's discrimination, may violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; but the school's purpose is not any less educational because of
this involvement. It is doubtful that a court of equity would consider
a charitable trust for a school a trust for an illegal purpose if the school's
location violated a zoning ordinance. Why, therefore, should equity
consider the purpose of a private school illegal if its operation inci-
dentally violates the Fourteenth Amendment? The Internal Revenue
Service would have to respond that the state-involved private school
is altogether-and not just incidentally-illegal, because it is a form
of subterfuge by the state for avoiding the consequences of Brownm v.
Board of Education. This argument would be forceful, admittedly;
but it would not obtain its force by analogy to charitable trust law.
Resort to charitable trusts on this question leads merely to more am-
biguity. There are no precedents, and an equity court might logically
decide either way. It might consider the state-involved school an
evasion of Brown, or it might pass over the potential violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an "ancillary matter."
It would seem only proper for a court to choose the former course
51. InternalRevenue Service News Release, supra note 21.
52. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 Cum. Buar . 116.
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and bring Brown and related cases53 into the law of educational chari:
ties. These cases, however, introduce policies and values incompatible
with the doctrine that segregated education can benefit the public, and
whose logical culmination is not disapproval of segregation in private
schools involved with the state, but the denial of charitable status to
all segregated schools. This is precisely the conclusion the IRS has
resisted.
To support the logic of this conclusion, it is necessary to reconsider
the basic statement that the law of charities tolerates racial restrictions
upon educational charities. This reference to the law of charities be-
longs to what might be called the "categoric tradition" of charitable
trusts. None of the cases and only a few of the commentators call it
by this name; nevertheless, there is a trend running through some of
the case law of charitable trusts that is biased towards more of a con-
ceptual and less of an ad hoc approach. Essentially, this trend displays
a penchant for categories of charitable purposes; and for the sake of
discussion it will be called the "categoric tradition." 14
At common law, a trust that would otherwise be void for violation
of the rule against perpetuities or for designation of indefinite bene-
ficiaries is valid if it meets the criteria of a charitable trust. The basic
criterion is that the trust be established for public benefit, and the con-
tribution of the categoric tradition is a two step formula for resolving
this decision. The formula first presupposes categories of charitable
purposes, which vary from case to case, but which usually merely
restate Lord MacNaghten's classic statement of charitable purposes in
Pemsel v. Special Commissioners.5 MacNaghten declared that the
common law growing out of the Elizabethan statute of charitable uses
defined "four heads of charity": the relief of poverty, the advancement
of religion, education, and miscellaneous purposes for the public good.6
In the categoric tradition, this declaration has come not only to define
the categories of charitable purposes, but to reflect an echelon among
them. The relief of poverty, the original mode of charity, stands high-
est in the hierarchy, as the charitable purpose that most serves the
public good. The class of beneficiaries of a trust for the poor, there-
53. Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Poindexter v.
Louisiana, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967); Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp.
560 (E.D. Va. 1965).
54. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 849 (1950).
55. 3 British Tax Cases 53 (1891).
56. Id. at 96. ' -
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fore, can be- confined rather narrowly; since, according to the second
step of the categoric formula, the ranking of the trust purpose de-
termines the permissible breadth of the beneficiary class. A trust for
education stands somewhat lower in the hierarchy and, therefore, the
class of beneficiaries must be broader than for a trust to relieve the
poor. As for various undertakings outside the three established cate-
gories, they are presumed to be more dubiously related to the public
good and, consequently, must serve a broad segment of the public to
merit charitable trust treatment. 57
It was this tradition of charitable trust law that the IRS drew upon
in making its private school ruling and in issuing Revenue Ruling 67-325.
The latter ruling, on recreational charities, was no doubt inspired by
Mr. Justice White's concurrence in Evans v. Newton:5
The first three categories identified by Lord MacNaghten desig-
nate trust purposes that have long been recognized as beneficial to
the community as a whole-whether or not immediate benefit is
restricted to a relatively small group . . . But the present trust
(for a park) falls under the fourth category and can therefore be
sustained as charitable only because the generality of user benefici-
aries establishes that it is beneficial to the community.59
In Baddeley v. Inland Revenue Comm., 6 Lord Somerwell advanced
a similar opinion:
I think that difficulties are apt to arise if one seeks to consider
the class apart from the particular nature of the charitable purpose.
They are in my opinion interdependent. There might well be a
valid trust for the promotion of religion benefiting a very small
class. It would not at all follow that a recreation ground for the
exclusive use of the same class would be a charity.61
The categoric tradition is obviously a recurring thesis in charitable
trusts. There is, however, a persistent antithesis. Much case-law is
characterized by a very uncategorical, empirical attitude towards char-
itable trusts, 62 an approach that normally takes the form of sweeping
57. See 4 A. Scott, supra note 42, § 368; Atiyah, supra note 45.
58. 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
59. Id. at 308.
60. [1955] A.C. 572. See also Atiyah, supra note 45.
61. [1955] A.C. 572, 615.
62. See Annot., 12 AJL.R.2d 849 (1950).
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flourishes on the nature of charitable purposes. The statement of the
Supreme Court in Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings," is a
classic example:
The great weight of opinion seems to be that a charitable trust
which is neither against public law nor against public policy may
be applied to anything that tends to promote the well-doing and
well-being of social man.64
Authorities on charitable trusts not only acknowledge this rather un-
doctrinal approach, they regard it as the "ultimate law" of charitable
trusts.65 Scott, for example, follows the tradition of the established
categories and accepts the Pemsel classification. He, nevertheless, re-
fers also to a more general test: is the accomplishment of the trust
purpose "of such social interest to the community as to justify per-
mitting property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity?" 66 He
clearly indicates that this latter test is the over-riding criterion.
English courts have manifested a similar attitude. Lord Normand in
Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co., 67 the principal English
case on educational trusts, prefaced his opinion by remarking: "I re-
mind your Lordships of the observations of Lord Simonds in Gilmour
v. Coats,66 that the law of charity has been built up not logically but
empirically. It is this empirical development which has so baffled efforts
to reduce the law to systematized definitions." 69 Oppenbeim is in ac-
cord with English"0 and American cases71 in its scrutiny of educational
63. 95 U.S. 303 (1877).
64. Id. at 309.
65. See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 YALE LAW J. 979 (1957). "Purposes worthy of community support are
diffuse as the winds. They vary with time .... Because of this constant flux, attempts
to formalize the community benefit into abstract rules inevitably degenerate into a
listing of ad hoc responses to particular situations." Id. at 997.
66. 4 A. Sco-r, supra note 42, S 368.
67. [1951] A.C. 297.
68. [1949] A.C. 426, 443.
69. [1951] A.C. 297, 309.
70. In re Shaw, [1957] 1 All E.R. 745, noted in 73 L. Q. REv. 305 (1957). George
Bernard Shaw made a special bequest to underwrite research on a new English alphabet.
The court held that the trust, despite its educational purpose, would not be of benefit
to the community. The parties compromised in lieu of appeal, and the matter never
reached the House of Lords.
71. See, e.g., Wilber v. Asbury Park Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 142 NJ. Eq. 99, 59
A.2d 570 (1948); Medical Soc. of South Carolina v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 197
S.C. 96, 14 S.E.2d 577 (1941). In Wilber, a testimentary trust to publish the writings
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trusts and finding that public benefit was lacking. One authority notes
that "[t] his new approach to charities does not mean that courts have
abandoned their traditional favor towards charitable trusts. It simply
means that the intrinsic merits of a proposed charity are issuable; and
trusts are not to be upheld just because they come within a traditional
category."172 In short, the categoric tradition is one approach among
several for determining the public benefit of a charitable trust.
Alternatively, a court might apply its own ad hoe, empirical judg-
ment and dispense with Pemsel as defining something which by nature
is inchoate. Or it might pay passing deference to the category of the
trust, but delve into its merits. Either of these alternatives would meet
the approval of the authorities. In the words of Bogert:
The courts should be left free to apply the standards of the time
on the theory that what may be charitable in one generation may
be non-charitable in a later age, and vice versa. Ideas regarding
social benefits and public good change from century to century
and vary in different communities. It must expand with the ad-
vancement of civilization and the daily increased needs of man.73
Scott is in complete accord with this view, stating that "[t] he in-
terests of the community... vary with time and place. Purposes which
may be regarded as laudable at one time may be regarded as subserving
no useful purpose or even as being illegal." 74
Because of the ad hoc test and built-in assumption of change and
growth, no recitation from the traditional law of charities alone can
answer the question of whether the purpose of a trust is charitable.
Charitable trust law is wedded to current values, and the traditional
law yields to these values. An excellent example of the working of
this rule is the treatment of recreational facilities.
In Re MacDuff, [[1896] 2 ch. 451] among various instances of
philanthropic but not charitable objects suggested by counsel and
Court, two at least, public recreation grounds and an astrophysical
of the testator was held unenforceable because the writings were deemed of no value
to the community. In the Medical Society case, the testator left her old home in
Charleston as a museum, replete with its furnishings. The court found the proposed
museum of little historic interest, and therefore of virtually no value to the com-
munity. See also In re Pinion, [1965] 1 Ch. 95.
72. Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 849, 859 (1950).
73. 2 G. Boc RT, Tm LAW oF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 1129 (1935).
74. 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 42, § 368, at 2630.
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observatory, are now unquestionably charities .... The reason is
not so much a change in law as a change in knowledge, sociaI
consciousness, and social conditions.75
In recent years, the concept of education and public benefit has under-
gone a comparable "change in knowledge, social consciousness, and
social conditions." Various authorities on trusts have asserted and
sought to demonstrate that trusts providing for segregated schooling
are inherently uncharitable, taking their cue from the Supreme Court
in Brown v. Board of Education:
To separate ... [Negro students] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of in-
feriority as to their status in the community that may affect their
minds and hearts in a way unlikely ever to be undone.7 6
The Civil Rights Commission in its report Racial Isolation in Public
Schools,7 emphasized that segregated education prevents white stu-
dents from developing attitudes appropriate to an integrated society.
The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders'78
concurred in that report and continued:
,.. [W]e believe school integration to be vital to the well-being
of our society. We base this conclusion not on the effect of racial
and economic segregation on the achievement of Negro students,
although there is evidence of such a relationship; nor on the effect
of racial isolation on the even more segregated white students,
although the lack of opportunity to associate with persons of dif-
ferent ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds surely limits their
learning experience. We support integration as the priority edu-
cation strategy because it is essential to the future of American
society. We have seen in this last summer's disorders the conse-
quences of racial isolation, at all levels, and of attitudes towards
race, on both sides, produced by three centuries of myth, ignor-
ance, and bias. It is indispensable that the opportunities for inter-
action between the races be expanded. The problems of this
-15. Bronyate, supra note 45, at 280.
76. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
77. UNITED STATES ComIV-ISSIoN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1967).
78. REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (New York
Times ed. 1968).
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society will not be solved unless and until our children.are brought
into a common encounter and encouraged to forge a new and
more viable design of life."9
If the principle of adaptive change built into charitable trusts were
unresponsive to this development of informed sentiment, it would be
difficult to understand the adage that charitable trusts comply "with
the standards of the time." Courts in the past have approved or dis-
approved recreation grounds, temperance leagues, vivisection societies,
and other purportedly charitable purposes primarily on a subjective
definition of need, a standard which is virtually whimsical when com-
pared to the case against segregated education.80
A basis for the argument that an educational trust can be racially
restricted and still charitable is found in Restatement (Second) of
Trusts:
A trust to establish or maintain a school- or other educational in-
stitution... is charitable although the beneficiaries are limited to
those residing in a particular district or belonging to a particular
class, provided that the class is not so small that the purpose is
not of benefit to the community.8'
Despite its provision for restrictive classes, this section specifically re-
states the cardinal principle of charitable trusts: there must be an en-
during benefit to the community. The number of beneficiaries is a
rule of thumb for measuring community benefit, but it is not an end
in itself. If the consequences to the community balance out as more
adverse than beneficial, the end value is vitiated, and the trust should
fail, regardless of the nature or number of beneficiaries. Evidence on the
harm to the community of segregated schooling is today too abundant
and too compelling for a court ingenuously to ignore. Students whose
schooling is segregated receive the benefit of an education, but the value
of their education to the community must be discounted by the "social
79. Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
80. See generally 4 A. Scott, supra note 42, § 374. Cf. Dorsen, Racial Discrimination
in Private Schools, 9 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 39 (1967); Lusk, The Uncertain Future of
Charitable Trusts, 15 AIA. L. Rxv. 390 (1963); Miller, Racial Discrimination and
Private Schools, 41 MiNe. L. Rav. 145 (1957); Parker, Evans v. Newton and the
Racially Restricted Charitable Trust, 13 How. L.J. 223 (1967); Power, The Racially
Discriminatory Charitable Trust, 9 ST. Louis U.LJ. 478 (1965); Note, Constitutionality
of Racially Restricted Scholarship, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 604 (1958).
81. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 370(j) (1959).
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disvalue" of learning and maturing in a racially segregated environment.
Against this discounted value must be balanced the injury done to the
community by a practice which invidiously stigmatizes a class of its
population.
This is all a very stiff way of stating a doctrine that a growing number
of cases have come to represent.8 2 In Howard Savings Institute v.
Peep83 and in Estate of Ruth Snively Walker,8 4 Amherst and Stan-
ford (respectively) refused to accept the benefits of testamentary
trusts conditioned on racially exclusive uses. In both cases, the respec-
tive courts invoked cy pres and voided the racial clauses rather than
allowing the trusts to revert to residuary legatees. In Coffey v. William
Marsh Rice University, 5 a Texas appellate court held that Rice could
no longer pursue the purpose of its founder to provide "excellent edu-
cation" if it was also obligated to follow his provision that it admit only
white students. The court, accordingly, eliminated the racial provision
from the endowment trust.
The facility with which these courts disposed of racial provisions
is ominous for the future of racially exclusionary clauses in charitable
trusts. These cases present solid precedent for departing from a strict
standard of cy pres whenever it is desirable to mitigate a racially restric-
tive condition. Although never declared illegal, the restrictive require-
ments were treated with a disfavor that was equally as lethal. None of
the courts found it difficult to subordinate the settlor's intention with
respect to the racial restriction, and each appeared to sympathize dis-
creetly with the institution unwilling or unable to enforce an exclusion-
ary clause. In view of these decisions, a conclusion that the law tolerates
racial restrictions upon educational charities is questionable.
While these holdings render racial exclusions in charitable trusts
unreliable and subject to excision by a court of equity, two cases recent-
ly decided go radically further. After Sweet Briar Institute v. Button8 6
and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown;, 8 7 racial exclusions in
charitable trusts (educational or otherwise) appear to be virtually un-
enforceable. Sweet Briar Institute, a Virginia college for women, was
82. These cases are cited and discussed in Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Discrhninating Look at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable
Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272 (1967).
83. 34 NJ. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1963).
84. No. 70195 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1965).
85. 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1966).
86. 12 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1188 (W.D. Va. 1967).
87. 392 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1968).
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established by a testamentary trust providing for admission of white
women only; A Virginia statute in effect when the trust was established
permitted charitable trusts for only exclusively white or exclusively
colored education. The statute was still in force when Sweet Briar
brought an action in a federal district court against the Attorney Gen-
eral of Virginia, seeking a permanent injunction against any suit his
office might bring should the college not comply with the racially
restrictive terms of its endownment trust. Relying on Pennsylvania v.
Board of Trusts,88 a three judge court ordered that ".... the defendants
-and their successors in office be, and each of them is hereby, permanently
enjoined and restrained from enforcing against the plaintiff any provi-
sion in the will... limiting education in Sweet Briar Institute of only
such girls and young women as are of the white race." 89
The court might have held the restrictions on the Sweet Briar trust
unenforceable because they were required by a statute that contravened
the Fourteenth Amendment, or it might have enjoined the attorney
general from enforcing that or any law of Virginia against Sweet Briar
trustees should they decide to admit Negro students. The court, how-
ever, entirely ignored the implications of Virginia law and held that
the attorney general would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if he
sought to enforce the racial provisions of the endowment trust. The
reference to the Girard College case, Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts,"
suggests the court's rationale. In that, the first phase of the Girard litiga-
tion, the Supreme Court found the City Board of Trusts of Girard Col-
lege to be an agency of the state, subject to the requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Presumably, the federal court in Sweet Briar rea-
soned that any action by the attorney general to compel Sweet Briar
trustees to comply with racial terms of the trust would effectively
convert the trustees to agents of the attorney general. The attorney
general would then become the party responsible for the continuing
segregation. He would be to Sweet Briar as Philadelphia and Pennsyl-
vania had been to the City Board of Trusts of Girard.
Frequently action by the state attorney general is the only means
of enforcing racial restrictions should the trustees of a charitable trust
decide to abandon the restrictive terms. It is this important means of
enforceability that Sweet Briar forecloses. If Sweet Briar is followed,
88. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
89. 12 RAcE REr. L. RP,. at 1189.
90. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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an attorney general can no longer act to enforce the racial restrictions
of a charitable trust without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
Brown v. Pennsylvania Board of Trusts,91 apparently the final sequel
to the Girard litigation, not only lends support to Sweet Briar, but
appears to go further, threatening even privately prosecuted actions to
enforce racial exclusions in charitable trusts. The district court in Com-
monwealtb of Pennsylvania v. Brown92 followed Evans v. NeWton93
and held that the trustees substituted by the Orphan's Court to oversee
Girard College were so "entwined" with the state and so supported by
state "momentum" that they were as much an agency of the state as
the City Board that preceded them. The district court declined to hold
further that the participation of the Orphan's Court in the enforce-
ment of the racial terms of the Girard trusts came within the ambit
of Shelley v. Kraemer.94 On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the trial
court's comparison of the Girard College situation with Evans v. New-
ton. But the majority expressly held in addition, that replacing Girard's
board of trustees with persons committed to upholding the will violated
the limits placed on the judiciary by Shelley v. Kraemer. Just as an
attorney general's suit would convert private segregation into state
segregation, the action of the Orphan's Court made the trustees even
more responsive to state authority. Judge McLaughlin, writing for the
majority, cited Sweet Briar and continued, as though in comparison to
the Sweet Briar situation, that:
Had the City Trustees been left undisturbed it is inconceivable
that this bitter dispute before us would not have been long ago
lawfully and justly terminated. It is inconceivable that those
City Trustees would not have with goodwill opened the College
to all qualified children.95
Judge McLaughlin implied that had the Girard trustees "raised their
sights with the times" and on their own abandoned the racially restric-
tive provision, judicial action to force compliance with the trust would
have involved the state in racial discrimination violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment as proscribed by Shelley v. Kraemer. By expressly
relying on Shelley, the Third Circuit extended their holding of Brown
91. 392 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
92. 260 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
93. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
94. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
95. 392 F.2d at 125.
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v. Pennsylvania Board of Trusts beyond Sweet Briar. Shelley involved
private covenantees suing to enjoin a covenantor from conveying prop-
erty to a Negro purchaser. The alignment of this case with Shelley
appears to mean that in a suit by private parties with standing, a court
could not constitutionally enjoin trustees of a charitable trust to adhere
to racially exclusionary terms.
Judge Kalodner concurred that "rthe Fourteenth Amendment is
contravened under the Shelley doctrine, where there is active mter-
vention of the state courts in the furtherance of enforcement of
restrictions denying citizens their civil rights because of their race,
color, or creed." 96 Kalodner, however, saw significance in the fact
that the Orphan's Court had acted sua spont6 . Brown v. Pennsylvama,
therefore, appears to hold that judicial action to enforce racially re-
strictive terms in a charitable trust is as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment as judicial action to enforce a racially restrictive covenant
in a deed.
It may fairly be concluded, therefore, that the position assumed by
the Internal Revenue Service on the law of charities was erroneous,
or at least outmoded. It is one of those anachronisms that have become
common in the evolution of civil rights law One might challenge
this conclusion by arguing that Sweet Briar and Brown v. Pennsylvania
have been interpreted too broadly; that the cy pres cases discussed are
too few to be the sample of a trend. In taking up this counter-argu-
ment, however, it is at least established that the law of educational
charities is in a state of uncertainty If this law is unsettled, it fails as
a source of reference for the charitable sections of the Internal Revenue
Code.
Two conclusions, then, are tenable. The bolder conclusion is that
the law of educational charities does not support the position assumed
by the Service in 1967 in granting tax exemption to private segregated
schools, and that it is more in accord with the recently announced
policy of revoking and denying exemptions. The only other tenable
conclusion is that the law of educational charities is in a state of change
concerning the question of racial restrictions, and therefore an analogy
to charitable trusts on this question is indecisive. It neither supports
nor opposes tax exemption for private segregated schools. In any case,
it is at least clear that this body of law will not sustain exemptions for
96. Id.
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racially restricted schools, and the Internal Revenue Service's use of
trust law as a basis for exemption was a misapplication of the law.
THE TANK TRUCK DOCTRINE
The basis for grounding the allowance of tax exemptions to private,
segregated schools in the common law of trusts, if it ever existed, has
certainly dissipated. At the same time, an opposing theory first put forth
by the Civil Rights Commission has been recognized. Its basis is the
common sense rule that the Internal Revenue Code should be applied
in consonance with other laws and policies, and particularly the Con-
stitution. The decision in Green v. Kennedy,9 7 it will be recalled,
turned on this fundamental point. In tax law this principle has most
often been recognized in what has commonly been called the Tank
Truck doctrine.
The lower federal courts developed a rule of tax policy disallowing
business deductions for fines or forfeitures paid by a business for having
violated a law or regulation. In 1958, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue brought three cases to the Supreme Court that turned on the
disallowance rule conceived in the lower courts. In Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Connissioner8 the Court gave its imprimature to the
rule and elaborated the doctrine behind it.9
The decision in Tank Truck denied the taxpayer a business deduc-
tion under Internal Revenue Code section 162(a) for penalty fines it
had paid. The taxpayer, a truckline, had incurred the penalties for
violation of highway maximum weight laws. The Court felt that it
was improper, as a matter of policy, to sanction deductions that would
frustrate national or state policies, by mitigating the "sting" of the state-
imposed penalty. Speaking more generally, Justice Clark for the Court
stated:
We will not presume that the Congress, in allowing deductions
97. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D. D.C. 1970). See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
98. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
99. Great Northern Ry. Co., 8 B.T.A. 225, aff'd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1927) is said
to be the origin of the Tank Truck doctrine. For a discussion prior to Tank Truck,
see Lurie, Deductibility of "Illegal" Expenses, [1952] N.Y.U. li-I INST. ON FED. TAX.
1189. See also ALI FED. INcoMz TAx STAT. § X154(i) (May 1952 draft); 4 J. MFRTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INcomB TAxAnTON, §§ 25.50-.54, 25.131-.136 (1960); Tyler, Disallowance
of Deductions on Policy Grounds, 20 TAx L. REv. 665 (1965); Note, Business Expenses,
Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning witb the Internal
Revenue Code, 72 YALE Lj. 108 (1962).
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for income tax purposes, intended to encourage a business enter-
prise to violate the declared policy of a State .... Although each
case must turn on its own facts ... the test of nondeductibility al-
ways is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting
from allowance of the deduction. The flexibility of such a stand-
ard is necessary if we are to accommodate both the congressional
intent to tax only net income, and the presumption against con-
gressional intent to encourage violation of declared public
policy. °0°
In Commissioner v. Sullivan,101 a companion case, the Court held
payments for rent and wages by an Illinois "bookmaker" to be deduct-
ible business expenses, despite the fact that the payments were in viola-
tion of Illinois law. In explanation, it was pointed out that a deduction
in this case would not allow the taxpayer to evade or diminish the
penalties for "bookmaking" under state law. Justice Douglas emphasized
that, Tank Truck notwithstanding, the federal income tax was imposed
on a net income base. "If we enforce the rule espoused by the Com-
missioner in this case, we would come close to making this type of
business taxable on the basis of its gross income. If that choice is to be
made, Congress should do it." 1012 The rule has thus been left to case-
by-case construction and has been applied almost exclusively under
section 162 (a) (business expenses), although it has occasionally been
extended to section 165 (business losses). The meaning of "frustra-
tion" is still open to refinement, and likewise the requirement that the
policy frustrated be "declared government policy" is still malleable.
"Government policy" has not been refined to mean only state or federal
statutes, but has normally been used interchangeably with "public pol-
icy," with several implicit conditions to be discussed below.10 The
preceding outline of the Tank Truack doctrine is sufficient for dealing
with the obstacles faced in carrying it over to sections 170(c) and
501 (c) (3).
Because the Tank Truck policy has been applied only under section
162(a) and section 165 of the Code, extension to sections 170(c) and
501(c) (3) would be an innovation. Despite this novelty, Tank
100. 356 US. at 35.
101. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
102. Id. at 29. See Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions
Should be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REv.
1142 (1943).
103. See also B. BnTzER, supra note 7, at 279-84.
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Truck actually applies more consistently to the charitable sections than
to the business expense and loss sections because disallowance of a
charitable deduction does not violate the fundamental of taxing only
net income. Deductions under the Code may be grouped into three
classes:104
(i) expenses incurred in the production of income;
(ii) involuntary personal expenses (e.g., personal exemptions,
state taxes, medical expenses, interest, dependency deduc-
tions);
(iii) charitable deductions.
Denial of a charitable deduction does not in any manner convert the
tax base to a gross income base, for with or without the section 170(c)
deduction, taxable income is still net after business expenses, and it
is still the net after deduction of "involuntary personal expenses."
Similarly, denial of charitable exemption under section 501 (c) (3) re-
sults only in taxing an institution on its net income. The Tank Truck
doctrine, therefore, carries over to the charitable sections of the Code
without encountering the objections to a gross income tax expressed
in Sullivan.'"5 It applies without friction under these sections, in con-
trast to its application under the business expense and loss sections where
it is in conflict with the nature of the federal income tax.
Although the application of the Tank Truck policy under the char-
itable sections of the Code would not impair the basic scheme of a net
income tax, it might be argued that it would clash with the purposes
of the charitable sections. The purpose of permitting charitable de-
ductions is generally accepted as the encouragement of private wealth
diffusion to beneficial public uses. The charitable exemption is com-
monly rationalized as relieving from taxation organizations which serve
the public good, and whose service would be cut back pro tanto by
taxation. There is the added argument that the government strikes a
good bargain by giving exemptions and deductions; the cost of fore-
gone revenues is said to be less than what the government would have
to spend to provide the public services. 106
104. White, Deductions for Nonbusiness Expenses and an Economic Concept of
New Income, JoirNr Cozms. ON ECONOMIC REPORT, FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECoNoMIc
GROWTH AND STABILTY, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1955).
105. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958). See text accompanying notes 101,
102 supra.
106. For a critical examination of these theories see Rabin, Charitable Trusts and
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Libertarians have perceived something more in these sections. In
their view, the charitable sections of the Code symbolize a preference
for private centers of action and innovation. The important fact is
not so much that private wealth diffuses to the public good, but that
the decision as to what constitutes the public good devolves upon the
private sector. They find social, political, and economic value in this
devolution.107
Socially and politically it is argued that decentralization favors
pluralism and polycentralism. Political theorists have observed that a
multiplicity of independent, private institutions is conducive to de-
mocracy.' Economically, it may be argued that private organizations
serving the public good are more responsive, more efficient in the serv-
ices they render, and more innovative. 0 9 This point of view implies
a minimum of administrative manipulation. If charitable deductions
and exemptions were too closely regulated, the preferences of the IRS
would supplant private preferences, and the libertarian mechanism
would collapse.
While this argument has force, it also has limits. It is one thing to
say that the charitable sections of the Code express a preference for
private centers of action and innovation. It is quite another to say that
the government through these sections invites the private sector to
frustrate its official policies. Part of the libertarian argument is an
emphasis upon efficiency, and it would scarcely be efficient for the
government to commit itself to a particular policy and simultaneously
induce private institutions to take up a contrary course of action.
More relevant here is the argument that ours is a plural society, and
that the charitable sections of the Code stem from the tolerance that
makes pluralism functional. This argument, too, has its limits. Not
all values can be defended in the name of pluralism, and it scarcely fol-
lows from pluralism that government is morally neutral on all matters.
Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 912 (1966); Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy
and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 171 (1965). The Rabin article discusses
Taussig, The Charitable Contributions Deduction in the Federal Personal Income Tax
(1965) (unpublished doctoral dissertation on file at Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology and New York University libraries).
107. A collection of sources representing this point of view is contained in Rabin,
supra note 106, at 920-25. See Broughton, The Economic Function of Foundations,
FOUNDAnTON NEws, Sept. 1964, at 1; Case, Philanthropy as a Social InvestMent, FoUINDA-
noI NEws, March 1964, at 1.
108. S. LipsEr, J. CoLEmAN, M. TRow, UNION DEMocRAcY 13-16 (1956).
109. See Saks, The Role of Philanthropy: An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REv. 516,
524 (1960).
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Some consensus values are enforced, notwithstanding views to the con-
trary. Incorporation of Tank Truck would only make these values
operative in the charitable sections of the Code. The doctrine might
give the IRS more leverage in ruling on exemptions and deductions,
but it would not open the door to displacement of private preferences
by bureaucratic values, because it could only be invoked to avoid the
frustration of "declared government policy."
The charitable sections of the Code cannot reasonably be permitted
to commit the non sequitur of encouraging private action to thwart
government policy. What Justice Clark said of section 162(a) in
Tank Truck may as plausibly be said of section 170(c) and section
501(c) (3).11 It should be equally improper as a matter of policy to
sanction charitable deductions for exemptions that would "frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of
conduct, evidenced by some government declaration thereof." lx
The question that remains is whether there is a public policy, meeting
Tank Truck standards, that is frustrated by exempting segregated private
schools from taxation. For Tank Truck purposes, "public policy" is
a notional concept that falls somewhere between private ethics and
statutory law. The Supreme Court in Lilly v. Commissioner, 1 2 estab-
lished that the public policy to be accommodated in the tax code must
have more sanction than merely business or professional ethics. It must
at least be evidenced by some governmental declaration, but from which
level of government the declaration must emanate is not entirely cer-
tain. Following Lilly, in Kirtz v. United States,"3 the Court of Claims
upheld a deduction taken by an insurance agent on kickbacks to cor-
porate officers who had procured their corporation's insurance business
for him. The court implied that had the practice been condemned by
the state insurance commissioner the kickbacks would have been non-
deductible. The court added, however, that had the kickbacks been
malum in se, they would have been nondeductible-with or without an
edict from the commissioner.
While the reference to a standard of malum in se is nebulous, ap-
parently on this criterion, a number of courts have disallowed deduction
for commercial bribes, resting their decision not so much on specific
statutes, but on a more implicit policy opposed to bribery. Why it is
110. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
111. 356 U.S. at 31.
112. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
113. 304 F.2d 460 (Ct. C1. 1962).
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that bribes are more venal than kickbacks is not clear, but presumably
if the practice is universally execrated, the government may be assumed
to oppose it.
The Supreme Court has shed some light on the source of "public
policy" in its latest decision on the Tank Truck doctrine, Commissioner
v. Tellier,n 4 in which it held that public policy did not bar the deduc-
tion of legal expenses for defense against criminal prosecution. The
decision upset a body of lower court precedent to the contrary, but the
Court regarded the reasoning of previous cases as seriously mistaken:
No public policy is offended when a man faced with serious
criminal charges employs a lawyer to help in his defense. That
is not 'proscribed conduct.' It is his constitutional right .... In
an adversary system of criminal justice, it is a basic of our public
policy that a defendant in a criminal case have counsel to repre-
sent him. 1 5
For this conclusion, the Court cited Gideon v. Wainwright,"6 the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964,117 and, more broadly, the adversary
system and the Constitution. By thus citing Gideon, the Supreme Court
implied that judicial opinions may evidence "government declarations"
of policy.
On the same model of reasoning, Bro'wn v. Board of Education""
(and cases following it), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196411
reflect a "declared government policy" broadly opposed to segregated
education. Browurn addresses itself specifically to public schools but the
opinion, as noted above, condemns all racially segregated education.
Title VI applies only to schools receiving federal assistance funds, but
viewed contextually, is indicative of the federal government's opposi-
tion to segregated schooling. Further, the policy of an assortment of
Fourteenth Amendment decisions is violated, repulsed, or frustrated by
granting tax exemption to segregated private schools. For example,
114. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
115. Id. at 694.
116. 373 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Supreme Court held that indigent criminal
defendants in state courts are entitled to have counsel appointed by the court to
assist in their defense.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (1965). According to its provisions, an indigent defendant
charged with a federal crime is entitled to have reasonable counsel fees and litigation
expenses paid by the United States.
118. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1964).
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in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,'12 the Court intimated
that the state in leasing its property might have exacted a covenant
not to discriminate from the Eagle Coffee Shoppe. Partly because of
this abdication in the face of an opportunity to restrain racial discrim-
ination, the state was held to have "insinuated" itself into the coffee
shop's refusal to serve Negroes. By comparison, the IRS probably
could not prohibit private school segregation by disallowing the schools
tax exempt status, but by granting exemption, the Service would lose
an opportunity to make racial discrimination by these schools more
difficult.
Burton, of course, applies the Fourteenth Amendment. But on the
authority of Boiling v. Sharpe,'2' the same standards would probably
apply to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. In fact pursuant to Executive Order 11246,122
the federal government requires that government contractors not dis-
criminate racially in their employment policies. An earlier Executive
Order requires a similar vigilance against discrimination on the part of
all government agencies in their transactions related to residential hous-
ing.123 It was thus anomalous that the IRS dispensed tax benefits to
private segregated schools while the FHA could not insure mortgages
on property burdened by a racial covenant, and the Defense Depart-
ment could not make a contract without a commitment on the part
of its contractor to avoid discriminatory employment practices. Tax
exemption of private segregated schools is, in effect, a condonation of
racial discrimination inconsistent with decisional law and with policies
that have been promulgated by the executive branch. Moreover, a
grant of tax exemption gives the government's recognition to the school
and its approval to a policy that racially restricted education is none-
theless charitable in nature, of benefit to the community, and an act of
public good deserving favored tax treatment. This recognition is in
itself, quite apart from any tax benefits bestowed, at odds with the policy
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has reached this conclusion in a number of
cases. In Lombard v. Louisiana,124 and Peterson v. City of Greenville,2 5
120. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
121. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
122. 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1967).
123. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (Supp. 1964).
124. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
125. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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city and county officials publicized their approbation of segregation in
local restaurants. The Court found their approval to have colored
private discrimination with state action. Reviewing these and other
Fourteenth Amendment cases, a three-judge federal court in Lee v.
Macon County Board of Education126 decided that it is "axiomatic
that a state may not induce, encourage, or promote private persons
to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish." 127
The Supreme Court, too, gave its sanction to this proposition in Reit-
man v. Mulkey.128 In striking down a California constitutional amend-
ment that would have effectively foreclosed open-housing legislation,
the Court held that the provision would involve the state in racial
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The exemption of private segregated schools from federal taxation
'is not condemned as such by Brown, Burton, Lombard, or Reitman,
but each of these cases in its own way espouses a policy opposed to
state approval, encouragement, or even condonation of racial discrimina-
don. By overlooking discrimination prior to July 1970, the Service
has in a sense, condoned private school segregation. By certifying
that such schools served the public good and deserved favored tax treat-
ment, the Service granted these schools a form of official approval.
Every solicitation for funds could bear the notation that the school had
been approved by the IRS as charitable, and therefore, that gifts would
be tax-deductible. Moreover, to the extent that tax deduction made
donations more attractive, and to the extent that tax exemption eased
operating costs, the Service can be charged with having helped to
finance and encourage the development of private segregated schools.
Soon after Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court broadly
stated its opinion of government financial assistance to segregated
schools. Taking critical notice of developments towards desegregation
.in Arkansas in Cooper v. Aaron,129 the Court admonished that "State
support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management,
funds, or property cannot be squared with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's command that no State shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 130
126. 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967). A tuition grant statute was determined to
be an integral part of a state sponsored move to maintain a dual school system.
127. Id.
128. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
129. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
130. Id. at 19.
19701
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
In its 1967 news release, the Service announced that Cooper v. Aaron
was its basis for refusing exemption to any private segregated schools
that were direct recipients of state financial support.' 3' Perhaps the
Service felt that literal adherence to the Cooper dictum was proper and
deferential to the Supreme Court, but it hardly did justice to the Court
to attribute to it a distinction of such naivete. In Griffin v. State Board
of Education,'3a this distinction was summarily dismissed: "Nor do we
think weight is to be accorded to the fact that the money is paid to the
pupil or the parent, and not to the school, for the pupil or the parent
is a mere channel." 13 The Griffin court felt that it was enough to hold
that predominant state support of segregated private schools is unconsti-
tutional. Later decisions further reduced the criteria. In Poindexter v.
Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission,34 the court pointed out that
"[a] segregated school predominantly supported by State funds is an a
fortiori case of unconstitutional State action." 135 Simkins v. Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital3 6 indicates how low the level of government
assistance can go and still amount to state action. Cone Memorial Hos-
pital received 17 percent of the cost of two additions in Hill-Burton
funds. Because of this financial assistance from the federal government,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the hospital to cease
its discriminatory practices. Shortly thereafter, this standard was codi-
fied in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 37
Cone authorized injunctive relief, whereas Title VI prescribes a selec-
tive termination of federal funding. Both, however, are alike in dis-
approving discrimination in any program or institution that is receiving
any amount of federal financial assistance. Though Cooper and Cone,
like Burton and Reitman, are not specifically addressed to tax exemp-
tion, they unarguably evidence a policy opposed to government financial
131. Internal Revenue Service News Release, supra note 21.
132. 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965).
133. Id. at 563.
134. 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967).
135. Id. at 853.
136. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
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involvement with segregated institutions. If tax exemption for private
segregated schools would not give grounds for action against the Service
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it would nevertheless be irrecon-
cilable with policies that have grown out of the amendment. 38 Whether
or not exemption would directly violate the amendment, it clearly
would not represent the accommodation between the tax code and "de-
clared government policy" which the Tank Truck doctrine requires.
CONCLUSION
It seems fair to conclude that federal tax exemption of private, segre-
gated schools cannot be defended upon any reasonable grounds. The
initial decision to exempt such schools was insupportable on its face.
It required the Internal Revenue Service to overlook its own sundry
rulings over a period of years, as well as the policies and practices of
numerous federal agencies. The Service claimed to find a basis for its
position in charitable trust law, but only by ignoring a growing trend
of decisions can exemption be rationalized by analogy to the law of
charitable trusts. It is clear, moreover, that exemption of private, segre-
gated schools tended to frustrate an established objective of the Four-
teenth Amendment and a policy pursued by the federal government
for more than a decade. Such a contradiction of policy is opposed by
both precedent and logic, and perhaps the strongest grounds for denying
exemption is to be found in the Tank Truck doctrine. The announce-
ment by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in July 1970 is a welcome
and overdue recognition that the exemption of private, segregated schools
has no foundation in federal tax law.
138. See Note, Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated Private Schools, 68 CoLum. L. REv.
922 (1968).
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